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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-GOVERNMENT CLAIMS-POWER OF A BANKRUPTCY
COURT TO ALLOW AN AFFIRMATIVE JUDGMENT ON A
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Danning v. United States (9th Cir. 1958)
In this bankruptcy proceeding the United States filed a tax claim
against the bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy counterclaimed seek-
ing affirmative relief against the United States. The referee held that a
court of bankruptcy does not have jurisdiction to entertain such a counter-
claim, and a petition for review was denied by the district court. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that a court
of bankruptcy, although having jurisdiction to entertain counterclaims up
to the amount of the Government's claim, has no jurisdiction to grant
affirmative relief on such counterclaim. Danning v. United States, 259
F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1958). 1
It is well settled that without specific statutory consent2 no action
may be brought against the United States,3 and no officer of the United
States can waive the requirement of such consent.4 In bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, as in other actions, a counterclaim 5 may be maintained up to
the amount of a creditor's claim, even when that creditor is the United
States.6 This is true whether the bankruptcy court has summary juris-
diction over such claim 7 or whether the creditor must institute a plenary
action in order to recover thereon.8 When affirmative relief is sought on a
counterclaim, such relief will be granted against a creditor not possessing
sovereign immunity if the bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction.9
1. Danning v. United States, 259 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1958).
2. Rrv. STAT. § 1059 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1952) :
"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States:(1) Founded upon the Constitution; or
(2) Founded upon any act of Congress; or
(3) Founded upon any regulation of an executive department; or
(4) Founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States; or
(5) For "liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
3. Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1906).
4. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
5. See Note 50 COLUM. L. Rpv. 505, 508 n. 30 (1950) distinguishing set-off, re-
coupment, and counter claim.
6. Rnv. STAT. § 951 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 2406 (1952); United States v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247
(1935).
7. In re Clayton Magazines Inc., 77 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1935).
8. United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
9. 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 108; Honeyman v. Hughes, 156 F.2d 27
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However, where the action is one in which a plenary suit would have
to be brought to recover on the counterclaim, the courts are divided as
to whether even a private creditor, by filing a claim in the bankruptcy
court, waives that court's lack of jurisdiction over plenary proceedings,
thereby allowing the court to grant affirmative relief on the counterclaim.' 0
Where the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction to grant affirmative
relief on a counterclaim against a private creditor, it has generally been
held that affirmative relief on a counterclaim against the United States
will not be awarded if the court has no statutory authority to entertain
a direct suit against the Government." In United States v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. 12 the Supreme Court held that the awarding of an affir-
mative decree to a trustee in bankruptcy on a counterclaim against a fed-
eral tax claim, was invalid for lack of jurisdiction since the court which
entered the decree had no statutory authority to entertain a direct action
against the Government. The Court in that case reasoned that a set-off
up to the amount of the Government's claim was a valid defense and,
therefore, permissible, but any affirmative award would violate the Gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity, it being, in the nature of a direct action
by the trustee. 1 3 In Re Greenstreet,1 4 a bankruptcy proceeding, it was
held that affirmative relief against the United States will not be granted
where a counterclaim is for more than 10,000 dollars since the district
courts' jurisdiction under the Tucker Act' 5 is limited to suits for less than
10,000 dollars. The opinion of the court there would seem to indicate that
had the suit been within the statutory limit, affirmative relief might have
been granted notwithstanding the fact that since the passage of the Tucker
Act the courts have been in conflict as to whether or not that act extends
the right of counterclaim to include affirmative relief. Some courts reason
that the Tucker Act applies only to direct suits, and therefore, the United
States has not waived its sovereignty as to counterclaims for affirmative
relief;16 while other courts hold that since the Tucker Act gives authority
10. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1945); James Talcott
Inc. v. Glavin, 104 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1939); Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784(4th Cir. 1938) ; In re Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Contra B.F. Avery
& Sons Co. v. Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951); Kleid v. Ruthbell Coal Co.,
131 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1942).
11. United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 511, n. 6.
14. 209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1954). Accord, North Dakota-Montana Wheat
Growers Assn. v. United States, 66 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1933) ; United States v.
United States Tin Corp., ,148 F. Supp. 922 (Alaska 1957) (contract counterclaims
on mortgage foreclosures).
15. The Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1952) gives
the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims in all the situa-
tions in section 1491 where the amount does not exceed 10,000 dollars, and the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, section 1346(b) gives the district courts exclusive jurisdiction
over any suits for torts committed by a government employed, acting in the scope
of his employment, in which a private person would have been liable.
16. United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 206 Fed. 431 (2d Cir. 1913) (contract
counterclaim on a tax claim) ; United States v. Thompson, 150 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.
W. Va. 1957); United States v. Double Bend Mfg. Co., 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y.
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for a direct suit it should also apply to counterclaims for affirma-
tive relief.'
7
Although the court relied on extensive authority, it would appear that
such authority is distinguishable from the instant case, since in the cases
the court cited, the courts did not have jurisdiction to entertain a direct
suit, and, therefore, could not allow a counterclaim for affirmative relief.
In the instant case, if the statute' creating courts of bankruptcy is one
which extends the jurisdiction of the district courts to include bankruptcy
proceedings, rather than one which constitutes the district courts as sep-
arate courts of bankruptcy, the court would have jurisdiction up to the
amount of 10,000 dollars as provided for in the Tucker Act, and possibly
for more under the Federal Tort Claims Act. If the statute extends the
jurisdiction and a direct suit would be allowed under the Tucker Act or
the Federal Tort Claims Act, there seems to be no reason why a counter-
claim for affirmative relief should not be allowed against the Government
within the jurisdictional limits provided by those acts,19 assuming, as the
court did here, that a federal district court has jurisdiction to grant affir-
mative relief on a counterclaim against a private creditor. However, if
the courts are established as separate courts of bankruptcy, they would
have no jurisdiction over an original suit, because the Tucker Act and
Federal Tort Claims Act would not apply, 20 and therefore, they could
not entertain a claim for affirmative relief against the Government. Though
the court did not discuss this problem, 21 in view of the fact that the present
trend is to allow affirmative relief in cases under the Tucker Act and the
Federal Tort Claims Act,2 2 a better decision might have been to allow
relief on the counterclaim and to construe the statute as enlarging the
jurisdiction of the district courts. John G. Hall
1953) ; United States v. Lashlee, 105 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. Ark. 1952) (counterclaims
on same contract) ; United States v. Nine Acres of Land, 100 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.
La. 1951); United States v. 1070 Acres of Land, 52 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ga. 1943)
(counterclaims on eminent domain proceedings); Graske v. Johnson, 97 F. Supp.
679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (counterclaim by individual for overpaid income taxes against
government's tax claim) ; In re Flato, 68 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (counter-
claim by trustee in bankruptcy for overpaid taxes against government's tax claim) ;
United States v. Biggs, 46 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Ill. 1942) (contract counterclaim on
suit).
17. United States v. Silverton, 200 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1952) ; United States v.
Petaschnick, 143 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (counterclaims on the same con-
tract) ; United States v. King, 119 F. Supp. 398 (Alaska 1954) (counterclaims for
repairs under statutory lien in action for recovery of the chattel).
18. 30 Stat. § 45 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1952).
19. It may be argued that adjudications in bankruptcy are settled by a referee
and not by a district court judge, but this would appear to be of little merit since the
decision of the referee is subject to review by the district court.
20. Both the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act apply only to the
district courts. See note 14, supra.
21. The opinion of the court does not deal with this problem nor does it state
whether the district court would have had jurisdiction over a direct suit rather than
a counterclaim, although it does intimate that the counterclaim is a tax claim which
could be brought under the Tucker Act. No figures are given and as the lower court
has not yet written an opinion, it is impossible to determine whether the 10,000 dollar
limit under the Tucker Act applies.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-RECOVERY UNDER
NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT NOT A BAR TO SUIT
AGAINST FELLOW-EMPLOYEE IN STATE OF ACCIDENT.
Ellis v. Garwood (Ohio 1958)
This was a tort action brought in Ohio to recover for the death of
plaintiff's husband allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendant
fellow-employee. Plaintiff's husband and defendant were on company busi-
ness in an auto driven by defendant when the collision occurred which-
caused the death of the decedent. The accident occurred in Ohio. De-
fendant's answer alleged that plaintiff had recovered an award for her
husband's death under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act.'
Defendant further contended that since the New York statute is exclusive
in that it precludes further recovery by one who has received an award
thereunder, this action against him as fellow-employee was barred. Plain-
tiff's demurrer to defendant's answer was overruled and the action was
dismissed. The court of appeals reversed this judgment. The Ohio Court
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Ohio law does
not bar the additional suit against the fellow-employee even though plaintiff
recovered an award in another state which purports to give an exclusive
remedy. Ellis v. Garwood, 152 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio 1958).2
The United States Constitution commands that "full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other State". 3 Pursuant to this clause Congress has de-
creed that state statutes shall be given such faith and credit in every
court within the United States as they are given by law or usage in the
courts of the state which renders them.4 Even though workmen's com-
pensation acts are considered public acts within the meaning of the full
faith and credit clause,5 decisions of the Supreme Court, since Bradford
Electric Co. v. Clapper,6 have varied as to whether the state of employ-
ment, where that state has a workmen's compensation act purporting to
provide an exclusive remedy, or the state of the place where the injury
occurred, has the greater interest in protecting the injured employee, and
should therefore apply its law. In the Bradford case, the Supreme Court
refused to allow the employee to recover in the state where the injury
occurred, holding that the exclusiveness of the statute of the state of em-
ployment prevented him from so doing. The Court reasoned that the
state of the injury had only a casual interest in the enforcement of the
employee's rights as compared with the interest of the state of employ-
1. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 29 (6).
2. Ellis v. Garwood, 152 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio 1958).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
4. 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
5. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Woodner Co.
v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Stacy v. Greenberg, 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d
619 (1952).
6. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
SPRING 1959]
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1959], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss3/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment.7 The Bradford case, however, was sharply limited by the subsequent
decision in Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,8 where
the Court found it proper for the state of employment to apply its own law
rather than the law of the state where the injury occurred, on the ground that
the state of employment had the greater interest in preventing the injured
employee from becoming its charge.9 Conversely, the Court in Pacific Em-
ployer's Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n 10 held that the state where the
injury occurred is free to apply its own law to the exclusion of the conflicting
law of the state of employment, reasoning that the situs of the injury being
in the forum state was sufficient to give that state a substantial interest in
granting recovery. Subsequently, however, the Court in Industrial Comm'n
v. McCartin" denied recovery of an additional award in the state of injury
where the employee had already recovered under the workmen's com-
pensation act of the state of employment, which statute purported to give
an exclusive remedy. Finally, in Carroll v. Lanza,12 the Court decided that
where the forum is also the state where the injury occurred, that state
has an interest in the protection of the injured employee, and its courts
need not recognize the exclusive remedy of the state of employment, even
when payments are being made under the workmen's compensation act
of that state. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in that case, found it
difficult to comprehend how the state of injury could have the interest in
protecting the employee's rights that exists in the state of employment.
He reasoned that under the "interest weighing" approach of the Bradford
case, the exclusive statute of the state of employment should have barred
recovery in the state of injury.13 More recently, a federal circuit court,
citing the Lanza case, held that a federal district court sitting in Michigan
in a diversity case could apply Michigan law to a suit by the injured
party's administratrix instead of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act merely because the accident occurred in Michigan though de-
ceased was employed and resided in New York.14
The instant case is another in the progression of decisions away from
the rule of the Bradford case that the forum does not have a sufficient
interest in choosing its own law merely because the injury occurred there. 15
Though the Court in the Lanza case allowed the forum to choose its own
law where it was merely the situs of the injury, it was careful to point out
that the interest which the forum has in choosing its own law, by virtue
of being the situs of the injury, is in the problems following in the wake
7. Id. at 151.
8. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
9. Id. at 535.
10. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
11. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
12. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
13. Id. at 414-16.
14. Sheerin v. Steele, 240 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957).
15. See, e.g., Pacific Employer's Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
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of the accident, mentioning specifically the problems of medical care and
. possible dependents. 6 Even if, however, the Lanza decision can be taken
to have held that the minimum interest requirement for a state to choose
its own law is satisfied by a showing of a mere possibility of other legal
problems arising within the state as a result of the injury, certainly that
possibility does not exist in the instant case where the injured party is
dead and was employed and resided in New York. Ohio's interest in
granting relief can be characterized as, at most, a casual one. It should
be doubted that the Lanza case has limited the command of the full faith
and credit clause in workmen's compensation situations announced in
the Bradford case to such an extent that a casual interest is now sufficient
to allow the forum to ignore the exclusive workmen's compensation act
of the state of employment. The court in the instant case, furthermore,
did not deal with the additional problem presented by the decision of
the Supreme Court in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,17 that if a com-
pensation award is res judicata in one state, the claimant is precluded
from recovery in a foreign state. The Supreme Court itself has frequently
avoided applying this rule by finding that the award under the workmen's
compensation act in the first state was not final.' 8 There appears to be
no question here that the New York award is final, but the plaintiff is
seeking recovery in Ohio against a different party. Though the New York
courts would not permit action to be brought by the employee against
the fellow employee in this situation, such action would not be barred
by the operation of the principle of res judicata, but because the statute
purports to be the exclusive remedy of the employee. 19 That this court
did not apply the Magnolia doctrine is, therefore, not surprising; but that
it did not even feel compelled to distinguish that decision, is probably
indicative of the prevailing attitude toward the authority of the Magnolia
case, and may suggest its eventual discard. Though the trend away from
the command of the full faith and credit clause in situations involving con-
flicting workmen's compensation act would seem proper in view of the
fact that coverage under these acts varies widely, 20 the instant case seems
to have departed from the spirit of the Lanza case by allowing Ohio to
choose its own law where it has only a casual interest in the consequences
arising from the injury occurring there.2 1
Edward J. O'Malley
16. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955).
17. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
18. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Industrial Comm. v. Mc-
Cartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
19. Cunningham v. Mark Rafalsky, 281 App. Div. 609, 121 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1st
Dep't 1953).
20. Compare Morrow v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936) with N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (1911).
21. In the recent case of Hagan v. John T. Cassale, Inc., 27 U.S.L. WIMK 2417,(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1959), the New York Supreme Court indicated that it
would expect the New Jersey courts to apply the New York Workmen's Com-
pensation Act where New York is the state of employment and New Jersey is only
the situs of the injury.
SPRING 1959]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEPORTATION-DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A
HEARING BEFORE HUNGARIAN REFUGEE-PAROLEE
MAY BE DEPORTED.
United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murif (2d Cir. 1958)
Appellant, a refugee who fled from Hungary at the time of the Hun-
garian revolution in 1956, executed a written application for himself and
family for parole into the United States pursuant to Section 212(d) (5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' After appellant's application
had been approved and he had established his residence in Baltimore, the
immigration officials learned that appellant had been a member of the
Communist Party subsequent to 1953,2 a fact which he acknowledged
but which did not appear on his application for parole. An exclusion
hearing was held, but the proceedings were limited to the question of
whether or not appellant had a valid immigration visa; and upon appel-
lant's admission that he had never been in possession of such a visa, the
Special Inquiry Officer found him to be inadmissible to the United States.8
An appeal from this determination was dismissed by the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, and a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed by the dis-
trict court. Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the
special circumstances involved in allowing the Hungarian refugees to
come to this country dictate that their parole may not be revoked without
a hearing at which the basis for the discretionary ruling of revocation
may be contested on the merits. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v.
Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958). 4
An alien seeking admission to the United States does not do so under
a claim of right, but only under a privilege granted him by acts of Con-
gress. 5 In determining whether an-alien, who has never been naturalized
or has never acquired any domicile or residence in the United States,
falls within the class to which the privilege has been extended, the de-
cision of an executive or administrative officer acting within powers ex-
1. Section 212(d) (5) provides: "The Attorney General may in his discretion
parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may pre-
scribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest
any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such
alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes
of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner
as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States." Immigration &
Nationality Act, 66 Sta. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1952).
2. Aliens who are communists are excluded unless they can show that for at
least five years prior to the date of the application for a visa, they have been actively
opposed to communism. Immigration & Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (28) (1952).
3. Visas are required of all immigrants and non-immigrants, with exceptions for
non-immigrant North American aliens. Immigration & Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 183
(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (Supp. 1953).
4. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
5. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1922); Chae Chan Ping v.
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pressly conferred by Congress is held to be due process of law.0 It is
well settled that the due process clause of the fifth amendment does not
apply to entering aliens ;7 therefore, it has been held that the Attorney
General may, in some instances,8 deny an entering alien a hearing, and
his finding on the alien's exclusion is conclusive.9 However, once an
alien has gained entry, the courts have accorded him the same protection
guaranteed citizens by the fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amend-
ments.10 Nevertheless, Congress does have the right to forcibly expel
a resident alien for any reason deemed appropriate, except for his valid
exercise of those rights protected by the Bill of Rights." However, be-
fore a resident alien can be expelled and deported, due process requires
that he be given a hearing; whereas an entrant alien can be excluded
and deported without a hearing.12 An arriving alien's temporary harborage
ashore, pending determination of his admissibility, is not, however, an
entry, and does not affect the alien's status, but is regarded as a stoppage
at the border.' 3 Similarly, an alien who has been excluded but is being
cared for by a society in New York until he can be deported is, in theory
of law, at the boundary line, and has no foothold in the United States.14
And an alien paroled into the United States under an immigration bond
is also not considered to be a resident alien.' 5 However, the Supreme
Court has considered an alien seaman on a ship of American registry seek-
ing readmission to be similar to an alien continuously residing and physi-
cally present within the United States.'6 Prior to the instant case, courts
have never considered parolees of any class to be resident aliens for
6. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) ; Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
7. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945) (concurring opinion); United
States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) ; see 52 CoLum. L. Rev. 1060,
1062 (1952).
8. A hearing may be denied if the Attorney General's finding of exclusion is
based on confidential information the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the
public interest. Immigration & Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 199 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(c) (Supp. 1953).
9. United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
10. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). It has been theorized that
the position of the resident alien within the United States is factually closer to that
of a naturalized citizen than to that of an alien seeking admission; therefore, the
grant to the resident alien of constitutional protection should more nearly correspond
to that given the citizen. See, e.g., Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ; Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
11. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135 (1945).
12. Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
and United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) with Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
13. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, supra note 12; United States v.
Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
14. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
15. United States ex rel. Lue Chow Yee v. Shaughnessy, 245 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.
1957).
16. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
SPRING 1959]
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purposes of determining whether a hearing is required before a parole
may be revoked.' 7
The court here has not held that Hungarian refugee parolees are
entitled to a hearing whenever the Attorney General exercises one of his
powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act.18 Nor has the court
decided that all parolees are to be considered resident aliens,19 or that
section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act manifests
congressional intent that all parolees be considered to be within the United
States. On the contrary, section 212(d) (5) indicates that it was Congress'
intent that parolees be considered to be without the United States, 20 and
the court was not able to find language in the act which indicates that
Hungarian refugee-parolees are to be distinguished from other parolees.2 l
Nevertheless, despite Congress' intent that parolees not be given hearings
before they are deported, the court has held that Hungarian refugee-parolees
are different from other parolees and do have the constitutional right of a
hearing before they can be deported for not having a visa. In making
this determination, the court relied on three factors which combine to
make the class of Hungarian refugee-parolees unique and which, in effect,
operate to preclude Congress from deporting them for not having a visa
without first according them a hearing. The refugees are physically present
within the United States.2 2 Furthermore, the manner of invitation extended
them to come en masse from Austria contributes to the unique status
of these refugees; theirs' is an express invitation rather than a privilege
which merely provides an opportunity to enter the United States.23 Finally,
they have accepted this invitation and despite their failure to have visas,
they are the invitees of the Government. They did not have visas when
17. The Court has held that temporary parole into the United States does not
entitle an alien to the benefit of the statute giving the Attorney General authority
to withhold deportation of any alien "within the United States" if the alien would
be subjected to physical persecution by deportation to the country from which he
came. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). However, even an alien
who is in the United States illegally is sufficiently within the United States to take
advantage of some of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act; e.g.,
the provision allowing for voluntary departure. United States ex rel. Giacalone v.
Miller, 86 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
18. As pointed out in the dissent, this would conflict with Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), which held that a Chinese parolee was not entitled to a
hearing when he Was attempting to invoke Section 243(h) of the Immigration &
Nationality Act.
19. Some classes of parolees have already been found not to be resident aliens;
Leng May Ma v. Barber, supra note 20; Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) ; United
States ex rel. Lue Chow Yee v. Shaughnessy, 245 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1957).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. See note 1 supra.
22. Therefore, they are to be distinguished from entrant aliens who are on
board ship or detained at Ellis Island. Cf., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Roggenbihl v. Lusby, 116
F.Supp. 315 (D. Mass. 1953).
23. At the request of the President, Congress passed a resolution specifically
authorizing the Attorney General to bring these refugees to the United States. Presi-
dential directive of December 1, 1956 referred to in his Message to the Congress on
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they left Austria, and the officials of the Government handling the matter
knew at all times that they had no visas and were not expected to have
them. It would appear to be inconceivable that, on the one hand, Congress
would open the door and extend an invitation to these aliens to enter, and,
on the other, close that door without first permitting them a hearing.
24
The reasoning that an alien, paroled into the United States by the express
will of the Government, is still to be considered without the United States
would seem to be logomachy. An alien who has not entered the country
clandestinely, and who has remained in the country for some time and has
become subject to its jurisdiction and a part of its population, should at
least be accorded a hearing before he is deported. In the instant case,
the court has apparently put the Government on notice that in the future
the practice of bringing aliens into the country and allowing them to
establish a permanent home here, but reserving the right to deport them
without a hearing, will be met with disfavor.
David H. Moskowitz
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCEss-AMENDMENT TO NATIONAL
HOUSING ACT RESTRICTING RENTALS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGH APPLICABLE TO PRIOR CONTRACTS FOR
MORTGAGE INSURANCE.
Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc. (U.S. 1958)
In 1949, Darlington was incorporated for the purpose of building and
operating an apartment house, and entered into an agreement for mort-
gage insurance with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) pur-
suant to the National Housing Act.' Although a maximum duration period
for rental was stipulated, no minimum period was expressed in the agree-
ment. When Darlington was in operation, it found that in order to realize
a profit it was necessary to rent a small percentage of its apartments for
periods of less than thirty days.2 However, in 1954, the National Hous-
24. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 547 (1950)
(dissent).
1. National Housing Act Amendments of 1942, ch. 319, § 608, 56 Stat. 303, 12
U.S.C. § 1743 (1946), amending 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). The purpose of the act, as
stated in § 608(b) (2), is to provide housing for veterans of World War II and
their immediate families. To achieve this, the FHA is authorized to insure mort-
gages, § 608(a), thereby stimulating the lending of private capital to those who desire
to provide such rental housing for veterans.
2. The district court, in Darlington, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 142
F. Supp. 341 (E.D.S.C. 1956), found that at no time were more than ten per cent
of the apartments used for transient rentals, and that there was no evidence that
Darlington failed to give preference to veterans, nor that any person desiring per-
manent residency had been required to wait for an apartment.
10
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ing Act was amended,8 declaring that the original purpose of the act was
to stimulate housing "designed principally for residential use," and that
subsequent use for transient or hotel purposes, i.e., for less than thirty
day periods, would be prohibited. Darlington sought a decree in a district
court declaring its right to lease for periods less than thirty days, and
FHA affirmatively sought an injunction requiring Darlington to cease
and desist from such practices. The lower court granted judgment for
Darlington on the ground that a statute enacted for the sole benefit of
private persons could not create a new obligation with respect to a past
transaction. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
National Housing Act under which plaintiff's mortgage was insured im-
plicitly denied to mortgagors acquiring mortgage insurance the right to rent
to transients, 4 and, even if such right was not denied, further regulation of
the mortgagor by way of amendment was permissible because no vested right
to rent to transients had attached. Three justices dissented, maintaining that
the words, "principally for residential use," did not preclude some transient
rentals,5 and further, that an imposition of additional conditions upon mort-
gagors on the basis of previously existing contracts for insurance operated
to impair vested rights and was therefore unconstitutional. Federal Housing
Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 141 (1958).16
The Constitution does not expressly prohibit Congress from impair-
ing previously existing contracts. It has been held, however, that con-
tracts are property, and that the rights and duties which are the subject
of the agreement become vested property rights upon formation of the
contract. 7 Since vested rights are protected from congressional inter-
ference by the due process clause of the fifth amendment,8 unless an
act of Congress is enacted pursuant to a constitutionally expressed power, 9
it will be invalid if the only construction possible is that it retroactively
divests rights previously vested.10 Until the instant case, whenever an
3. Housing Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 610, 12 U.S.C. § 1731(b) (Supp. V).
4. The majority opinion based this on such factors as the use of the terms
"dwelling units" and "housing" in the National Housing Act and the regulations
issued thereunder. Therefore, the majority stated that the term "principally for
residential use" was used so as not to preclude some commercial rentals.
5. It was pointed out in the dissent that the FHA had approved some transient
rental plans as submitted by other mortgagors, and that in granting plaintiff's appli-
cation a maximum rental period was specified, but no minimum period was designated.
6. Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 141 (1958).
7. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1933). Vested rights are ordinarily
said to vest when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
right of some particular person as a present interest. Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz,
71 N.D. 491, 2 N.W.2d 175 (1942).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. When vested property rights are taken for public
use, the private party is entitled to just compensation, as was pointed out in the
Lynch case.
9. For a case wherein Congress exercised an express power see Norman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), holding that in the exercise of powers
over revenue, finance and currency, Congress may invalidate provisions in private
contracts calling for payment in gold coin.
10. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1933) ; Noble v. Union River Logging
R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). A statute is deemed retroactive when it ". . . takes
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act of Congress had been struck down because of its retroactive effect,
it was struck down because vested rights had been directly taken or
annulled, as in Lynch v. United States," where the Supreme Court held
that beneficiaries of War Risk Insurance policies had a vested right to
compensation which Congress had improperly divested by annulment of
the policies. Under the fourteenth amendment, state statutes which have
merely impaired the enjoyment of vested rights, rather than completely
annulled them, have been found invalid as effecting a denial of due process.12
Although no cases involving acts of Congress have required a determina-
tion as to when vested contractual rights are merely impaired, it has been
held by the Supreme Court, when dealing with the constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting states from impairing the obligation of contracts, that
contractual rights are impaired when additional terms and burdens are
imposed upon the parties.13
As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, 14
it would seem that the term "principally for residential use" suggests
that transient rentals were not wholly excluded at the time plaintiff entered
into the agreement for insurance, and therefore, prior to the 1954 amend-
ment, plaintiff could make some transient rentals. If such is the proper
interpretation of the agreement, the imposition of additional burdens upon
plaintiff substantially impairs rights previously vested under the contract
for insurance. After defendant had granted plaintiff the right of mort-
gage insurance for a fixed term, in return for which plaintiff agreed to
various regulations imposed by defendant to insure that economical rental
housing would be provided for veterans, plaintiff made a substantial in-
vestment and began operations. Although the right to be insured, which
enabled plaintiff to acquire the necessary capital to begin operations, is not
completely annulled, the burden subsequently placed upon plaintiff greatly
diminishes the value of that right to such an extent that the resulting
loss of revenue will force the plaintiff into bankruptcy.' 5 The district
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new liability in respect to transactions or con-
siderations already passed . . . ." This definition was handed down by Justice Story
in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. 756 (C.C.N.H.
1814), and has been followed by both federal and state courts. For the use and
history of this rule see 20 MINN. L. Rev. 775 (1935-36).
11. 292 U.S. 571 (1933).
12. Chicago City R.R. v. Chicago, 142 Fed. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1905). The court
found that a right of dominion vesting in a streetcar company was impaired by the
requirement to accept transfers issued to passengers by other companies.
13. "The impairment of a contract may consist in increasing its burdens as well
as in diminishing its efficiency." Columbia Railway, Gas & E. Co. v. South Carolina,
261 U.S. 236 (1922). In a few cases, federal courts have stated that the due process
clause prohibits Congress from impairing the obligation of contracts just as clearly
as states are expressly prohibited under article one, section ten. In those cases, vested
rights were also divested. See Johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 208 (Ct. Cl.
1948).
14. Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 141, 147
(1958) (dissenting opinion).
15. The district court, in Darlington, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration,
142 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. S.C. 1956), found that bankruptcy would be the logical
result if plaintiff lost this source of revenue.
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court found, moreover, that Congress did not enact the 1954 amendment
under any constitutionally authorized power, but rather enacted it for the
benefit of private hotel interests, which interests should not justify the
taking of vested rights. Although the dissenting justices would apply
the rule of the Lynch case to congressional enactments which impair vested
rights indirectly, the majority opinion would seem to indicate that an
act of Congress which merely impairs a vested right indirectly, rather
than annuls such a right directly, will not be struck down, though not
enacted pursuant to a constitutionally authorized power. It may be that
once a contract has been entered into with the federal government, Congress
may exercise broad power to subsequently regulate the activities of the
private contracting party while the contract is in force, as long as rights
vesting under the contract are not directly annulled.
Charles C. Keeler
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS-
TAXES UPON ADVERTISING MEDIA.
Baltimore v. A. S. Abell Co. (Md. 1958)
Petitioners, owners of newspapers, radio and television stations, and
billboards, and the purchasers of advertising therein, sought a decree declar-
ing unconstitutional companion ordinances of the City of Baltimore which
imposed a four per cent tax upon the purchasers of certain advertising,'
based on gross sales price, and a two per cent tax upon the sellers of such
advertising, 2 based on gross receipts therefrom. Both taxes applied to:
space in newspapers and other printed matter published in Baltimore;
time on any intrastate radio or television broadcast originating in Balti-
more; space on billboards located in Baltimore; and space on vehicles or
airborne devices. More than forty-one per cent of all advertising done in
the area was not affected by the ordinances.8 The burden of the taxes
fell extensively upon newspapers and the purchasers of space therein, who
paid more than eighty-six per cent of both taxes for the first quarter of
1958. The remainder of the taxes fell most heavily upon the radio and
television stations. The Circuit Court of Baltimore City found both ordi-
nances unconstitutional as violative of the freedom of the press provisions
of the Federal and State Constitutions. 4 The MarylandCourt of Appeals
1. BALTIMORE, MD., ORDINANCE No. 1097, § 1 (1957).
2. BALTIMORE, MD., ORDINANCE No. 1098, § 1 (1957). The taxes under these
ordinances involve only impositions for the calendar year 1958, both ordinances having
been repealed.
3. This included interstate radio and television, which was exempted, and direct
mail and point of purchase advertising, constituting over thirty per cent of the
total advertising in the area, which was excluded.
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affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that ordinances which
purport to levy taxes on advertising in general, but which have the effect
of singling out broadcasting stations and newspapers, are a restraint upon
speech and press and, therefore, unconstitutional, despite the fact that
the enactors of the ordinances might have been actuated by the purest of
motives. The court considered both ordinances together, as both effectively
curtailed the necessary revenue of the broadcasting stations and news-
papers.5 Baltimore v. A. S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111 (Md. 1958) 6
The law is well settled that newspapers,7 and radio and television
stations8 are included within the constitutional protection of freedom of
the press. An ordinance providing for a ban on a newspaper by a city,9
as well as a state statute providing for a permanent injunction against a
newspaper,' 0 has been found to be unconstitutional as constituting previous
restraints upon publication. Although no cases have held that advertising
of itself is included within the free expression protection," the United
States Supreme Court, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,12 has held
that a tax upon the receipts from advertising imposed solely upon news-
papers is a previous restraint upon publication, and, therefore, unconsti-
tutional. The Court there described the device of imposing a tax solely
upon the press as being "single in kind." 13 Prior to that case, state courts
had upheld taxes levied solely upon newspapers.1 4 Cases subsequent to
the Grosjean case have upheld ordinary taxes imposed upon business in
5. In determining that the tax upon the purchasers of advertising could be
considered with the direct tax upon the newspapers and broadcasting stations, the
court found that four dollars out of every one hundred dollars budgeted for adver-
tising by the purchasers would be withheld in order to provide for the four per cent
tax, thereby curtailing advertising expenditures, and resulting in a direct effect upon
the media.
6. Baltimore v. A. S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111 (Md. 1958).
7. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930).
8. American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
9. Star Co. v. Brush, 104 Misc. 404, 172 N.Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
10. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930). In this case it was pointed out
by the Court that the protection from previous restraint upon expression can be
limited, but only in exceptional cases where it is necessary to protect the public
safety or morals.
11. Although the purchasers of advertising space were given standing to sue
in the instant case, the court pointed out that they did not exercise the right of
free expression on their own behalf, but rather on behalf of the public, for whom
the protection was intended, and that their standing to sue arose only after it could
be shown that the newspapers and broadcasting stations were restrained through
the curtailment of revenue.
12. 297 U.S. 233 (1935) (involving a two per cent tax imposed by Louisiana
upon the advertising receipts of publications having a circulation exceeding twenty
thousand copies per week).
13. 297 U.S. at 250.
14. See Preston v. Finley, 72 Fed. 850 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1896) (involving an
occupation tax, prohibitive in effect, on the business of selling a particular news-
paper); Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Pub. Co., 95 Va. 564, 28 S.E. 959 (1898)
(a privilege tax on the business of publishing newspapers had been imposed).
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general from which newspapers have sought to be exempted, 15 and have
dealt with the "single in kind" distinction made by the Supreme Court,
by reasoning that such distinction was based on the motive behind the
tax, i.e., to restrain.' 6 However, in a recent Supreme Court decision,
the Court, by way of dictum, warned that a tax might be invalid if its
effect was to restrain speech or press, even if such abridgment was not
contemplated.' 7
Prior to the instant case, state courts had distinguished the Grosjean
case from situations such as the one involved here, on the ground that
motive to restrain free expression is what was condemned by that case
rather than merely the singular effect of the tax upon avenues of expres-
sion.18  Of course, where the intent to restrain free expression can be
readily ascertained from the express purpose of the tax, and where the
direct tendency of a tax is to curtail a protected activity, the tax is in-
valid.19 However, the purpose of the protection of freedom of speech and
press is not so much to punish those who abridge the freedom of speech
or press, as it is to protect the public interest in a free interchange of
ideas. 20 Therefore, where it is shown that the effect of a tax is clearly
to single out a protected activity, as in the instant case, 21 thereby effec-
tively curtailing the dissemination of news and opinion, it is not necessary
to inquire into the purpose of the legislature in imposing such a tax. Of
course, a tax imposed upon business in general, for a legitimate govern-
mental purpose, also curtails the amount of revenue of an included, pro-
15. See Arizona Pub. Co. v. O'Neil, 22 F. Supp. 117 (D.C. Ariz.), aff'd mein.,
304 U.S. 543 (1938) ; Giragi v. Moore, 49 Ariz. 74, 64 P.2d 819, cert. denied, 301
U.S. 670 (1937); City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. App. 2d
282, P.2d 56, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 833 (1953) ; Tampa Times Co. v. City of Tampa,
158 Fla. 589, 29 So. 2d 368, appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 749 (1947).
16. Clearly, the motive for the tax was to restrain the larger publications which
had voiced sentiments unfavorable to the late Huey Long, then quite powerful in
the state government. This motive was compared by the Supreme Court in the
Grosjean case to the motive for the nocuous stamp taxes which antedated the first
amendment and led to its adoption.
17. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). Wherein the Court cited
the Grosjean case and stated that "statutes imposing taxes upon rather than pro-
hibiting particular activity have been struck down when perceived to have the
consequence of unduly 'curtailing the liberty of freedom of press assured under the
fourteenth amendment." The Court also found that abridgment of speech or press
may result from varied forms of governmental action, although such abridgment
is not contemplated.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. In the Grosjean case, the Supreme Court found that a tax imposed solely
upon the press curtailed the amount of revenue from advertising, thereby having a
direct tendency to restrict circulation. Since the purpose for the tax was also to
restrict circulation, the Court found the imposition unconstitutional.
20. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1935).
21. In the instant case, the court found that while the taxes were in effect, news-
paper linage in Baltimore decreased twelve per cent as compared with a national
average decline of less than eight per cent. The court determined that since ad-
vertising accounts for approximately seventy-five per cent of the revenue of news-
papers, the decline was due to a decrease in advertising revenue coupled with an
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tected activity; however, the effect is relatively incidental when spread
out in this manner.2 2 It would seem that no great burden is placed upon
the police power by forbidding this power to single out free expression
in order to force it to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of gov-




To PROCURE A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT.
Browne v. R. & R. Engineering Co. (Del. 1958)
Plaintiff, an engineer experienced in bidding on government contracts,
agreed with the defendant, who had never before prepared a government
bid, to attempt to place the defendant's name on the government bidding
lists, to prepare certain drawings for which the plaintiff would be paid
1000 dollars, and to help the defendants prepare estimates to submit to
the government. In return it was agreed that the plaintiff would be made
a partner or be paid a certain percentage of the contract price, if a con-
tract was obtained. Largely due to the plaintiff's drawings and estimates,
the bids were successful and resulted in a series of large contracts. When
the plaintiff brought this action seeking five per cent of the total contract
price as his fee, the district court held that an executive order' was de-
clarative of national public policy condemning such contracts as illegal,
and the plaintiff would not be allowed to recover, notwithstanding the
22. An additional argument raised by the petitioners, but not relied upon by
the court, was that there was a denial of equal protection. It was contended that
the ordinances discriminated arbitrarily and unreasonably against a certain segment
of the advertising media classification, particularly since no reasons were given for
excluding point of purchase and direct mail advertising which constituted over
thirty per cent of the total volume of advertising.
1. Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941). Section Five of Title II
provides that "every contract entered into pursuant to this order shall contain a
warranty by the contractor in substantially the following terms:
"The contractor warrants that he has not employed any person to solicit or
secure this contract upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage,
or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty shall give the Government the right
to annul the contract, or, in its discretion, to deduct from the contract price or
consideration the amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent
fees. This warranty shall not apply to commissions payable by contractors upon
contracts or sales secured or made through bona fide established commercial or
selling agencies maintained by the contractor for the purpose of securing business."
By a literal reading of ihis executive order it has been held that hiring an agent
soley for the purpose of having the contractor's name placed on the government
bidding list was an agreement "to solicit or secure a contract" and was unenforceable
since the contractor had hired an agent in violation of the warranty agreement.
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fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants had known of such public
policy or had been guilty of, or even contemplated, anything corrupt.
Browne v. R. & R. Engineering Co., 164 F. Supp. 315 (Del. 1958).2
An agreement to procure a government contract by the terms of
which undue influence is to be used on a government official is illegal and
unenforceable.3 Even if corrupt means were in fact not used, courts will
still not enforce such an agreement since it is violative of public policy. 4
Furthermore, contracts which merely have a tendency to induce the use
of undue pressures on government officials have been declared void.5
When consideration for services rendered in procuring a public contract
is contingent on the awarding of the contract, such agreements were held
to be illegal per se even before this executive order, since there is a tend-
ency to bring undue influence on government officials.6 However, if the
agent to procure the contract is employed on a continuing basis by the
contractor, or if he is an established commission agent, the blanket con-
demnation of contingent fee agreements does not apply. 7 Courts have
reasoned that in the latter situation the temptation for the agent to exert
improper influence is not as great as it is when an agent is hired to pro-
cure a specific contract for a contingent fee.8 Many states, however, do
not hold commission contracts to be illegal on their face, but rather
examine the circumstances of the agreement to determine whether cor-
rupt practices were used or contemplated; and, if not, the agent can re-
cover the agreed compensationY Prior to the promulgation of Executive
Order Number 9001,10 authority could be found in federal cases for this
less onerous test applied by some state courts." However, federal courts
have uniformly interpreted this executive order as laying down a policy
of prohibition on contingent fee commission arrangements 12 and as not
2. Browne v. R. & R. Engineering Co., 164 F. Supp. 315 (Del. 1958).
3. Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916) ; McMullen v. Hoffman, 174
U.S. 639 (1899) ; Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1881).
4. Allison v. Dodge, 287 Fed. 621 (3d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 774 (1926).
5. Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71 (1906) ; Providence Tool Co. v. Norris,
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45 (1865); Russell v. Courier Printing & Publishing Co., 43
Colo. 321, 95 Pac. 936 (1908).
6. See Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45 (1865).
7. Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1881) ; Buckley
v. Coyne Elec. School, 343 Ill. App. 420, 99 N.E.2d 370 (1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 927 (1952).
8. Reynolds v. Goodwin-Hill Corp., 154 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Hardesty v.
Dodge Mfg. Co., 89 Ind. App. 184, 154 N.E. 697 (1927).
9. Mitchell v. Jones, 104 Colo. 62, 88 P.2d 557 (1939); Robert & Co. v. Mort-
land, 160 Fla. 125, 33 So. 2d 732 (1948) ; Kansas City Paper House v. Foley Ry.
Printing Co., 85 Kan. 678, 118 Pac. 1056 (1911); Noble v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 237 Mass. 5, 129 N.E. 669 (1921) ; Swift v. Aspell & Co., 40 Misc. 453, 82
N.Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1903) ; Hall v. Anderson, 18 Wash. 2d 625, 140 P.2d 266
(1943). See also Hosack v. Taylor Bros., 142 Pa. Super. 83, 15 A.2d 489 (1940).
10. 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941).
11. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927); Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233 U.S.
705 (1914) ; Coyne v. Superior Incinerator Co., 80 F. 2d 844 (2d Cir. 1936).
12. Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Weitzel v. Brown-
Neil Corp., 152 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. W.Va. 1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 661 (1958)
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requiring a showing of actual or intended improper conduct to void the
arrangement.' 3 Although established commercial agencies are exempt from
the warranty requirement of this executive order pertaining to contingent
fee arrangements, nevertheless, if an agent is suing for his commission,
he has the burden of proving that he is a bona fide selling agency main-
tained by the contractor. 14
When confronted with a contingent fee arrangement as in the instant
case, courts are in an understandable dilemma. On the one side is the
desire to enforce an agreement from which the defendant has received
all the benefit and by which the defendant will be unjustly enriched, if
not enforced against him. Conversely, if the court allows recovery it is
giving legal effect to the type of contract that almost uniformly has been
found to have a tendency to bring improper pressure to bear on adminis-
trative officials. 15 The provision in this executive order that, upon dis-
covery that a contingent fee arrangement has been entered into in vio-
lation of the warranty by the contractor, the government may subtract
from the contract price the amount of the contingent fee suggests that
a prime consideration in including the warranty may have been a financial
saving to the government. 16 Under such an interpretation of the executive
order, the plaintiff in the instant case would not be barred from recovery
solely on the ground that the government may bring an action against
the defendant for breach of warranty. However, this executive order has
been interpreted as reaffirming the older decisions which invalidated com-
mission agreements in procuring government contracts for public policy
reasons.' 7 This rule was formulated at a time when the structure of the
federal government was relatively uncomplicated, far from the complex
organism that exists today. Under present conditions, when a company
goes outside its regular sales organization for the selection of an agent
to help secure a government contract, the contention is just as plausible
that it does so because of its own unfamiliarity with the maze of the
government procurement process, as it is that the company has done so
13. Many state courts, placing their own interpretation on Executive Order
Number 9001, still require a showing of improper activity in order to void a con-
tingent fee contract. Gendron v. Jacoby, 337 Mich. 150, 59 N.W.2d 128 (1953);
Leahy v. Brooklyn Waterfront Terminal Corp., 272 App. Div. 781, 69 N.Y.S.2d
596 (2d Dep't 1947); A.H. Haeseler Bldg. & Contracting Co. v. John J. Dupps
Co., 164 Ohio St. 188, 129 N.E.2d 383 (1954). But cf. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co. v. McAdams,
207 Misc. 525, 139 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. City Ct. 1955).
14. Bradley v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 159 F.2d 39
(2d Cir. 1947).
15. Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71 (1906); Providence Tool Co. v. Norris,
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45 (1865); Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
16. See Gendron v. Jacoby, 337 Mich. 150, 59 N.W.2d 128 (1953). See also
64 HARV. L. REv. 1200 (1951).
17. Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 931 (1951).
As to the force and limitations on executive orders generally, see A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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because the agent selected has some special access to government officials.
If the federal courts were to relax their prohibition on contingent fee
agreements per se, proof that the arrangement contemplated or resulted
in undue influence would still invalidate the agreement.' 8 Then, in the
absence of such a showing, an agent, even though hired specifically to
secure one contract, could recover for honest professional services ren-
dered just as a bona fide selling agent now may do.
John I. Guilfoyle, Jr.
EVIDENCE-RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION-ADMISSION OF CERTIFICATE
OF BLOOD TEST RESULTS IN DRUNKEN DRIVING PROSECUTION
AS EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE.
Kay v. United States (4th Cir. 1958)
Defendant was convicted of drunken driving on a federal parkway
under a Virginia statute' made applicable by the Assimilative Crimes
Act.' The statute provided, inter alia, that a certificate of the results of
test to determine the alcoholic content of the blood of defendant, and to
which he has consented, is admissible in court as evidence of the facts
stated therein. On appeal defendant protested the introduction into evi-
dence of a certificate of the results of his blood test to which he had
consented. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction holding that de-
fendant was not deprived of the right of confrontation of witnesses in
violation of the state or federal constitution, on the ground that such a
certificate met the requirements of a permissible exception to the hearsay
rule, viz., reasonable necessity, and assurance that the evidence has quali-
ties of reliability and trustworthiness. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476
(4th Cir.), cert. denied; 79 Sup. Ct. 42 (1958).3
It is well settled that the right of confrontation does not preclude
exceptions to the hearsay rule.4 But despite the fact that the provision
18. This was the result in Glass v. Swimaster Corp., 74 N.D. 282, 21 N.W.2d
468 (1946).
1. VA. CODe ANN. 1950, §§ 18-75-18-75.3 (1956). But for the clause allowing
the admission of the certificate as evidence, the statute involved in the instant case
is identical to those sections of the 1952 Uniform Vehicle Code dealing with drunken
driving (UNIFoRM VEHICL& CODE, Act V. § 54 (1952)) which establish presumptions
of sobriety or intoxication from different levels of alcoholic content of the blood
which have been constitutionally upheld as according due process. State v. Childress,
78 Ariz. 1, 274 P.2d 333 (1954).
2. 62 Stat. 686 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
3. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 79 Sup. Ct. 42
(1958).
4. See Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954); Common-
wealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 140 N.E. 465 (1923) ; Bracy v. Commonwealth,
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for the right of confrontation is worded similarly in all state constitutions
or declarations of rights,' it has met with a variety of constructions in
different jurisdictions in relation to the permissibility of hearsay excep-
tions. Arkansas considers the right of confrontation as a substantive right
for which nothing can be substituted because it imports the right of cross-
examination. 6 During the Prohibition Era, Texas, albeit other states
allowed certificates of chemical analysis of liquor, 7 held that such ad-
mission denies confrontation.8 Further, Texas has recently refused to
admit a certificate identical to the one in the instant case despite a statute
similar to the one involved here. 9 Louisiana has similarly been reluctant
to allow exceptions to the hearsay rule in criminal cases.10 On the other
hand, Rhode Island has held that confrontation is not an absolute right
applicable to all evidence, and that the test to be used by the court is
whether the facts are essentially documentary nothwithstanding that a
criminal prosecution is involved." Originally, absolute necessity for the
evidence was required before hearsay evidence would be admitted. 12  As
the use of documents as evidence developed, reasonable necessity became
the requirement, with the result that exceptions today are made where
the evidence sought to be admitted is merely more conveniently presented
than non-hearsay evidence on the same point.'8 Professor Wigmore points
out that the elements of necessity and trustworthiness are not applied with
equal force every time an exception is made, and one may be the real
basis for the exception while the other is applied loosely or even may
5. See 5 WIGMMORS, EVIDENCE § 1397 n.2 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1955) for each
provision.
6. Smith v. State, 200 Ark. 1152, 143 S.W.2d 190 (1940). See also Veatch v.
State, 221 Ark. 44, 251 S.W.2d 1015 (1952) (physician's report inadmissible unless
the physician is present to allow defendant the right of cross-examination) ; Jones v.
State, 204 Ark. 61, 161 S.W.2d 173 (1942) (notarized report of psychiatric board
as to defendant's sanity not admissible unless defendant can call at state's expense
any member of the board for cross-examination).
7. State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 131 Atl. 429 (1925); Commonwealth v.
Stoler, 259 Mass. 109, 156 N.E. 71 (1927); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass.
405, 140 N.E. 465 (1923) ; Bracey v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916).
8. Torres v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 1, 18 S.W.2d 179 (1929).
9. Estes v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 126, 283 S.W.2d 52 (1955). The statute
was not as specific as that involved in the instant case. It admitted as evidence
records of heads of state departments, not specifying explicitly blood test records
of the chief medical examiner.
10. See, e.g., State v. Green, 161 La. 620, 109 So. 143 (1926) (in manslaughter
indictment, certificate of death of deceased held inadmissible because facts could
be proved by oral testimony) ; State v. Joseph, 156 La. 862, 101 So. 21 (1924)
(physician's report inadmissible where physician was not present to be cross-
examined); State v. Davis, 149 La. 1009, 90 So. 835 (1922) (pedigree of blood-
hounds inadmissible).
11. State v. Ackerman, 49 R.I. 482, 144 Ati. 150 (1929) (search warrant was
admitted to prove legality of the search). See also State v. Guaraneri, 59 R.I.
173, 194 Atl. 589 (1937) (hospital records admitted as long as evidence is restricted
to diagnosis and treatment recorded therein). Contra, Robbins v. State, 93 Okla.
Crim. 363, 228 P.2d 663 (1951) (search warrant inadmissible as denying con-
frontation).
12. 5 WIGMOR, EViDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1955).
13. 5 id. § 1631.
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be lacking in some instances. 14 Where mere convenience is to substitute
for the necessity requirement, the quality of trustworthiness thereby be-
comes the true basis for the validity of the exception.'
In the instant case, by calling the certificate 'a record of a public
official, trustworthiness might conceivably be imputed by the lack of motive
to falsify inherent in the discharge of public duty.1 6 There are, however,
many opportunities for mistake since the test involves more than a mere
recordation of a manifested fact. For example, defendant's claim that
alcohol should not have been put on his arm as an antiseptic before draw-
ing the blood is in agreement with eminent authority.17 Further, the
blood test differs somewhat from the comparison of speedometers which
is involved in a speeding violation prosecution.' 8 There the test is a
simple matter with a result visible to any observer of ordinary intelligence.' 9
It is noteworthy that when the certified results of a blood test are ad-
mitted into evidence, there is the possibility that the presumption of inno-
cence in favor of the defendant may be destroyed since he is now required,
in effect, to prove that he was not intoxicated. In Kirby v. United States,20
the Supreme Court, basing its holding on the right of confrontation, said
that in proving an essential element of defendant's crime, that goods found
in his possession were stolen, the prosecution could not place in evidence
a record of conviction of persons who had stolen the goods, for then the
presumption of innocence would be of no consequence.21 For this same
reason, the Court in United States v. Elder22 said that where facts con-
stituting the offense itself are necessary to be proved, they must be proved
by living witneses who must confront the accused and subject themselves
to cross-examination. The fact that this is a criminal prosecution where
personal liberty is involved should indicate the necessity for caution in
creating new exceptions to the hearsay rule. Special consideration should
14. 5 id. § 1423, at 206.
15. Vanadium Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. See Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. v. United States, 240 Fed. 903 (3d Cir.
1917).
17. Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine In-
toxication, 29 VA. L. REv. 749, 754 (1943) ; DONEGAN, CHEMICAI TEST CASE LAW
20 (1950).
18. The admission into evidence of a certificate stating the results of a com-
parison of speedometers is a recent exception to the hearsay rule. People ex rel.
Katz v. Jones, 10 Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1958);
People v. Tyler, 109 N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1952) ; Commonwealth
v. Goldsmith, 176 Pa. Super. 283, 106 A.2d 659 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Schumann,
87 Pa. D. & C. 477 (Q.S. Berks 1953). But see, Commonwealth v. Baddorf, 42 Pa.
D. & C. 276 (Q.S. Dauph. 1941) ; Commonwealth v. Obenaeder, 40 Pa. D. & C. 155.
(Q.S. Ven. 1940). The certificates are used as proof that the speedometer of an
arresting policeman in a speeding violation prosecution has been tested against a
master speedometer.
19. People v. Tyler, 109 N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1952).
20. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
21. Id. at 55-56 ". . . for, as to this vital fact which the government was bound-
to establish affirmatively, (defendant) was put upon the defensive almost from the
outset of the trial by reason of what appeared to have been said in another crim-
inal prosecution . . . at which he was not entitled to be represented."
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be given to the effect of the exception on the presumption of innocence;
rather than concluding that since certain flexible requirements for hearsay
exceptions are met, the constitutional right of confrontation is not denied.
Nevertheless, this case is not out of line with recently approved exceptions
to the hearsay rule,23 and with further judicial approval might act as a
signal to state legislatures that the last constitutional barrier to an effective
prosecution of drunken driving violations has been hurdled.
24
Joseph J. Mahon, Jr.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-DIVERSITY JURISDICTION OF CORPORA-
TIONS-EFFECT OF 1958 AMENDMENT TO JUDICIAL CODE
ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP.
Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co. (E.D. Pa. 1958)
Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought a civil action for personal
injuries in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
against McCloskey & Co., a Delaware corporation having its principal
place of business in Pennsylvania. Defendant moved for dismissal for
want of federal jurisdiction on the ground that no diversity of citizenship
existed, since under the 1958 amendment to Section 1332 of the Judicial
Code,1 a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any state of incorporation
and of the state in which it has its principal place of business. The motion
to dismiss was granted. Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537
(E.D. Pa. 1958).2
Although it was clearly settled before the passage of the 1958 amend-
ment that a corporation is deemed a citizen of the state of incorporation
for diversity purposes, 3 there is still much confusion in regard to the
23. Certificates of speedometer tests, note 18 supra; certificates of liquor analysis,
note 7 supra.
24. For even under the Uniform Vehicle Code and the presumptions it set
up both the drawer of the specimen and the analizer must be put on the stand, and
chain of custody of the specimen must be shown. People v. Sansalone, 208 Misc. 491,
146 N.Y.S.2d 359 (County Ct. 1955) ; People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d
492 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954). Under the common law prosecution is even
more difficult, for expert testimony is necessary to prove the test used is reliable
and that from the results of the test the defendant is intoxicated in the opinion
of the expert witness. People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949)
Mora v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 321, 263 S.W.2d 787 (1954).
1. 72 STAT. 415, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958). The pertinent section
reads: "(c) For purposes of this section . . . a corporation shall be deemed a citizen
-of any state by which it has been incorporated and of the state where it has its
principal place of business."
2. Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
3. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) ; United States v. North-
western Express, Stage & Transp. Co., 164 U.S. 686 (1897) ; St. Louis & S.F. Ry.
v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896); Pennsylvania R.R. v. St. Louis, A. & T.H. R.R.,
118 U.S. 290 (1886) ; Memphis & C. R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581 (1882) ; Muller
v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1876).
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citizenship of corporations incorporated in more than one state.4  The
weight of authority is to the effect that'a corporation incorporated in the
state where suit is brought will be considered a citizen of that state alone,
even though incorporated elsewhere.5 Thus, a corporation incorporated
in states A and B and sued in a federal court in state A by a citizen of
state B could not successfully challenge the diversity jurisdiction by claim-
ing to be a citizen of state B, for in this action it will be considered only
as a citizen of state A;6 and conversely, if suit were brought in state B
by a citizen of state B, the corporation could successfully challenge di-
versity jurisdiction, for in such a case it would be considered as a citizen
of state B. 7 A contrary view was followed by the Third Circuit in Gavin
v. Hudson & Manhattan R.R.8 where the plaintiff, a citizen of New Jersey,
was permitted to sue defendant corporation, incorporated in both New
York and New Jersey, in a federal court in New Jersey by simply alleg-
ing in his complaint that defendant was a citizen of New York. Since the
instant case arose in the Third Circuit, the court had to determine the
effect of the 1958 amendment to the Judicial Code9 upon the rule of the
Gavin case. Plaintiff argued that the amendment making corporations
citizens of the state wherein their principal place of business is located
had no greater effect than to incorporate defendant in the state of its
principal place of business, and therefore, the Gavin case was controlling
in the case at bar. The court rejected this argument, and, limiting the
holding in the Gavin case to instances of multiple incorporation, dismissed
the present case for want of federal jurisdiction.
In order to obtain the result of the instant case, the court had to
read section 1332(c), as merely constituting a corporation a citizen of
the state where it has its principal place of business, and not as consid-
ering the corporation to have been incorporated in that state. Such a dis-
4. Compare Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 185 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950)
with Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R. 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952).
5. Patch v. Wabash R.R., 207 U.S. 277 (1907); Memphis & C. R.R. v. Ala-
bama, 107 U.S. 581 (1882); Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1876); Ohio & M. R.R.
v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286 (1862); Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.), aff'd., 347 U.S. 909 (1953); Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R.,
197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 81 F.2d
60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936) ; Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Eder,
174 Fed. 944 (6th Cir. 1909); Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Stults,
146 F. Supp. 241 (N.J. 1956); Lucas v. New York Cent. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
6. Pennsylvania R.R. v. St. Louis, A. & T.H. R.R., 118 U.S. 290 (1886); Muller
v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1877); Boston & M. R.R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d 749 (1st Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 715 (1936); Boston & M. R.R. v. Hurd, 108 Fed. 116
(1st Cir. 1901).
7. Memphis & C. R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581 (1882); Jacobson v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.), aff'd. 347 U.S. 909 (1953); Seavey
v. Boston & M. R.R., 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952).
The same result is reached where the corporation brings suit. Town of Bethel
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 81 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936) ;
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Stults, 146 F. Supp. 241 (N.J. 1956).
8. 185 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950).
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tinction is material in relation to the congressional intent only in the Third
Circuit where, under the Gavin case, a corporation incorporated in more
than one state can be sued in a federal court in one of the states of in-
corporation by a citizen of that state. Thus, if the Gavin rule were applied
in the present case, although plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania and
defendant's principal place of business is also in Pennsylvania, diversity
jurisdiction could still be invoked, since defendant is incorporated in
another state. The Gavin case, however, has been criticized by other cir-
cuit courts ;1o in a recent Third Circuit decision, Delaware River Joint Toll
Bridge Comm'n v. Stults," the Gavin case was not followed when a cor-
poration incorporated in Pennsylvania and New Jersey tried to sue a
citizen of New Jersey in a New Jersey district court. The court there
held that, by affirming the decision in Jacobson v. New York, N.H. &
H. R.R.,' 2 the Supreme Court had endorsed the view that a multi-state
corporation sued in one of the states of incorporation will be considered
as a citizen of that state and no other.' 3 To avoid the holding of the
Gavin case, the court in the present case strove to limit the Gavin case to
instances of multiple incorporation, 14 thereby making it inapplicable to
the case at bar. 15 It does not appear, however, that the court considered
the question whether section 1132(c) has changed the present rule that
a multi-state corporation sued in an incorporating state will be considered
as -a citizen of that state alone. The court construed this section, which
makes a corporation a citizen of any state of incorporation, as merely
a legislative endorsement of a long-established legal fiction.' 6 This view
would appear to be the more acceptable as corporations were considered
citizens of each state of incorporation even before the passage of this
amendment.' 7 It is doubtful that section 1132(c), by making corporations
citizens of "any" state of incorporation, impliedly rejects the present rule
on multiple incorporation, when the wording of the section is not in-
10. See Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F.2d 153, 155 (1st Cir.
1953); Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R., 197 F.2d 485, 488 (1st Cir. 1952).
11. 146 F. Supp. 241 (N.J. 1956). Accord, Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge
Comm'n v. Miller, 147 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
12. 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.), af'd., 347 U.S. 909 (1953).
13. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Stults, 146 F. Supp. 241, 242
(N.J. 1956).
14. Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537, 539, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
15. By such conduct the court gives tacit recognition that the Gavin case is
still controlling in the Third Circuit. In light of the fact that the case has been
seriously questioned, it would perhaps have been better if the court had expressly
repudiated the Gavin case even though such a determination was not essential for
a decision in the present case.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. Seavey v. Boston & M. R.R., 197 F.2d 485, 488 (1st Cir. 1952). When a
corporation incorporated in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island was sued
in New York by a citizen of Connecticut, the court held there was no diversityjurisdiction since the corporation was before the court as a citizen of all three states
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consistefit with the present rule on multiple incorporation' 8 and there is
no other language ii the amendment to indicate an intent to make such
a change. On the other hand, it is arguable that by using the word "any"
Congress intended to make a corporation a citizen of every state of in-
corporation, thus destroying diversity jurisdiction whenever an opposing
litigant is a citizen of one of the states of incorporation.', This view
would result in a greater reduction in diversity cases in the district courts,
but it involves a strained construction of the language of the statute, which
finds no support in the legislative history of the amendment. Indeed, the
rejection of a Senate proposal to make corporations citizens of every
state in which they do business 20 would seem to indicate that the intent
of Congress was not to restrict diversity jurisdiction to any great extent.2 1
It would appear that if Congress had intended to change the rule regard-
ing diversity jurisdiction in cases of multiple incorporation, it would have
done so in more specific terms. If, however, it is finally determined that
Congress intended to reject the Gavin case by enacting section 1132(c),
there would appear to be no obstacle to accepting plaintiff's argument that
Congress, by providing that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the
state where it has its principal place of business, merely intended to con-
sider the corporation as having been incorporated in that state for diversity
jurisdiction purposes. 22
Patrick M. Ryan
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-MANDAMUS-DISQUALIFICATION OF A
JUDGE FOR BIAS.
Green v. Murphy (3d Cir. 1958)
The petitioner, defendant in a criminal action which was to be tried
in the federal district court, filed. an affidavit alleging that the trial judge
was biased and prejudiced, and should be disqualified under the Federal
Disqualification Statute.' The specific contention was that because of a
18. Under this rule a corporation is considered as a citizen of each state of
incorporation, and it is only when an action is brought by or against a corporation
in a state of incorporation that the corporation will be considered only as a citizen
of the state where suit is brought.
19. See 72 HARV. L. Rev. 391, 395 (1958) ; Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction Amended,
44 VA. L. Rnv. 971, 975 (1958).
20. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2605 (1958).
21. Although reduction in the number of diversity cases was a primary purpose
of this legislation, Congress still wished to afford ". . . corporations doing business
over a wide territory, the sort of protection which they need against local prejudice
and the benefit of the salutary rules and practice of the federal courts." Id., at 2613.
22. Of course, such a result would not help plaintiff here since the purpose
of his argument was to gain the diversity jurisdiction advantages of the Gavin rule.
1. 62 Stat. 992, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1948). "Whenever a party to any proceeding
in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge
before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
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long friendship with the petitioner, the trial judge would, in an endeavor
to be just, lean toward the prosecution to a degree which would result in
unfairness toward petitioner. The trial judge refused to step down, stat-
ing that the facts alleged in the affidavit were not legally sufficient. The
circuit court sitting en banc, on petition for mandamus, without deciding
if the facts stated were legally sufficient to compel disqualification, held,
with two Judges concurring and one dissenting, that mandamus should
not be granted since petitioner's proper remedy was by way of appeal
after conviction. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).2
Mandamus is an original writ issued by a court compelling an in-
ferior court or person to perform some duty which arises from the official
or public status of that court or person.3 The writ of mandamus is ex-
traordinary in that it will not issue where there is another plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy at law ;4 generally, appeal is available to the party.5
However, where there are circumstances which would make the appeal an
inadequate remedy, such as when an irreparable injury would be sustained
by a party forced to wait until appeal, the court may issue mandamus.6
By statute,7 federal appellate courts have the power to issue mandamus
if the cause is within the court's appellate jurisdiction, which jurisdiction
includes not only cases acquired on appeal, but those which are capable
of being appealed.8 Since the federal statute which provides for disquali-
fication of a judge for bias or prejudice does not expressly authorize the
issuance of a writ of mandamus for removal, the circuit courts are divided
in regard to what is the proper remedy available when the judge refuses
to disqualify himself on the grounds that the facts recited in the affidavit
are not legally sufficient to demonstrate bias or prejudice. 9 Some circuit
courts, partly relying on dictum in Berger v. United States,10 have held
2. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
3. Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1861); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) .137 (1803).
4. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Sumcracki v. Stack, 269 Mich. 169,
256 N.W. 843 (1934); Homan v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82, 144 Atl. 897 (1929).
5. Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953) ; U.S. Alkali Export
Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) ; Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Munger, 20 F.2d
793 (8th Cir. 1927).
6. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947); Dilling v. United States, 142 F.2d
473 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 164, 83 N.W. 320 (1899).
7. 62 Stat. 944 (1948), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1949). "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate to their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and prin-
ciples of law."
8. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) ; Ex parte United States,
287 U.S. 241 (1932); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
9. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Mitchell v. United States,
126 F.2d 550 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 702 (1942); Saunders v. Piggly
Wiggly Corp., 1 F.2d 582 (W.D. Tenn. 1924).
10. 255 U.S. 22 (1921). The statement made by the Court in this case (that
appeal would be inadequate in a disqualification for bias) was made in relation to
the holding in the case that the judge may not.pass upon the truth of the facts alleged
in the affidavit filed. The point made by the Court was that if the judge could
pass upon the truth of the facts stated, appeal would be inadequate because of the
presumption that would support these facts upon appeal.
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that where the judge is alleged to be prejudiced, a writ of mandamus
may be issued requiring disqualification prior to final adjudication."
These courts reason that appeal is not an adequate remedy because it
would force the party to be tried by a partial judge, the very evil the
statute was designed to prevent. 12 Other circuit courts will issue mandamus
only where there are extraordinary circumstances that cause extensive
hardship, on the ground that unusual circumstances must be demonstrated
before the court would be justified in circumventing the appellate process.'3
However, courts following this view have yet to find circumstances war-
ranting the issue of the writ. Finally, a minority take the position that
appeal always affords an adequate remedy since the adquacy of a remedy
is not determined by the hardship or inconvenience to the party in being
required to wait, but by whether there is a remedy adequate to rectify
the trial judge's error.14
The majority, doubtful as to whether the case was even within its
appellate jurisdiction, decided that there were no extraordinary circum-
stances present that would warrant the issuing of mandamus. 15 The dis-
senting opinion, however, properly considers the proceeding as within the
appellate jurisdiction of the court since the term "appellate" is not limited
in its application to a cause on appeal but also applies to a proceeding
which revises and corrects, but does not create, a cause already instituted
in an inferior court.16 The extraordinary circumstances inherent in the
nature of a disqualification proceeding, moreover, should be sufficient to
satisfy any requirement for the issuance of mandamus. 17 In addition to
the extensive hardship caused a party forced to wait until after appeal
for a new trial, there are few circumstances which are more damaging
to the principle that justice must not only be done, but must appear to be
done in order to engender public confidence in the judiciary, than a trial
before a biased judge.' 8 Finally, the fact that a separate and elaborate
system of certification and filing has been provided for disqualification
proceedings would seem to indicate that Congress recognized the extra-
ordinary nature of such proceedings and contemplated a system which
would eliminate the usual necessity of appeal before a complainant's right
11. Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955); Connelly v. United
States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951).
12. Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909
(1949) ; Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; In re Lisman, 89
F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1937); Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 F.2d
545 (8th Cir. 1934).
13. Ibid.
14. People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Campbell, 212 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1954); Korer
v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1954).
15. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1958).
16. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S.(24 How.) 376 (1861) ; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
17. See Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951).
18. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn.
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can finally be determined.19 It would appear that as long as uncertainty
remains concerning the nature of mandamus, the proper remedy for dis-
qualification of an allegedly biased judge will be in doubt among the
federal courts.
Peter G. Nyhart
PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION-LIQUIDATION OF CORPORATIONS AS
ASSETS OF A PARTNERSHIP.
Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co. (N.J. 1958)
Plaintiff sought the dissolution of a family partnership consisting of
seven children and a widow.' Through the use of partnership funds, the
organization had acquired several corporations for the purpose of carry-
ing on various aspects of its business. The plaintiff-partner alleged that
the corporations were assets of the partnership, and since he was an
equal partner, dissolution of the partnership entitled him to an equal
share of the corporations. He further alleged that according to the original
partnership agreement 2 the corporations should be liquidated and their
assets distributed equally in cash. The trial court determined that the
corporations were not assets of the partnership and ordered equal dis-
tribution of the stocks to the partners. On appeal, the superior court
reversed, holding that the corporations were assets of the partnership, and
since the result of a stock distribution would be to transform a full partner
into a minority stockholder, the corporations should be liquidated to allow
an equal cash distribution among the partners. Fortugno v. Hudson
Manure Co., 144 A.2d 207 (N.J. 1958). 3
The question of whether an underlying agreement, existing prior
to the formation of a corporation, may govern the management or dis-
position of that corporation without violating the rule that the corporation
is to be managed by its board of directors has been answered differently
by various jurisdictions.4 Based on considerations of public policy,5 and
19. See Henry v. Speer, 201 Fed. 869 (5th Cir. 1913).
1. The plaintiff alleged misconduct in the handling of partnership funds and
affairs.
2. "That at the termination of this partnership, by reason of any cause, a full
and accurate inventory shall be prepared, and the assets, liabilities and income, both
gross and net shall be ascertained; that the debts of the partnership shall be dis-
charged; and all the moneys and other assets of the partnership, then remaining,
shall be divided in specie, between the parties, share and share alike." Fortugno v.
Hudson Manure Co., 144 A.2d 207, 211 (N.J. 1958).
3. Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 144 A.2d 207 (N.J. 1958).
4. See, e.g., Deboy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955) (a joint-adventure
agreement may survive a subsquent incorporation of that venture) ; Seaboard Air-
line R.R. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 240 N.C. 49, 82 S.E.2d 771 (1954) (court
will disregard the corporate agreement where it does not reflect true relationship);
Boag v. Thompson, 208 App. Div. 132, 203 N.Y.S. 395 (2d Dep't 1924) (corporate
agreement supersedes that of joint-venture).
5. See, e.g., Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921) ; Sun Rock
Stock & Land Co. v. Montana Trust & Say. Bank, 81 Mont. 222, 262 Pac. 1039
(1928)! Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 Att. 568 (1910).
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the intention of the legislature,6 New Jersey, in Jackson v. Hooper,T
adopted the rule that a business organization cannot avail itself of the
protective devices of a partnership through a prior partnership agreement,
and, at the same time, those of a corporation. 8 The court in that case
maintained that any partnership agreement whereby corporations to be
formed would be used as instrumentalities or agencies in the conduct of
all of the partnership business, independent of statutory control, could
not be enforced.9 If any remedy is available to the shareholders where
a prior partnership agreement is breached, it must be in their capacity as
shareholders for breach of a duty owed to them as shareholders.' 0 Many
courts, however, have adopted the view that a partnership may form
corporations for the purpose of conducting various phases of it's business,"
and that these corporations may be subject to the terms of the prior part-
nership agreement, 12 even though the corporations are used as instru-
mentalities of the partnership.' 3 Adopting the rationale of Wabash Ry. v.
6. See Leviton v. North Jersey Holding Co., 106 N.J. Eq. 517, 151 Att. 389
(1930) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 At. 568 (1910).
7. 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910).
8. "The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business as partners
may incorporate, with the intent to obtain the advantages and immunities of a cor-
porate form, and then, Proteus-like, become at will a co-partnership or a corpora-
tion, as the exigencies or purposes of their joint enterprise may from time to time
require. . . . They cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation to the rest of
the world." Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910).
9. Id. at 571.
10. E.g., Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921) ; Sun River Stock
& Land Co. v. Montana Trust & Say. Bank, 81 Mont. 222, 262 Pac. 1039 (1928) ;
Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 At. 568 (1910); Manacher v. Central
Coal Co., 284 App. Div. 380, 131 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1954). This is true
whether the prior agreement is a partnership or a joint-venture.
There is ample authority for the proposition that once a partnership or joint-
venture is established, the law pertaining to both organizations is the same. See
Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. Rev. 425, 442 (1950) ; Colowick, The Corpora-
tion as a Partner, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 76, 82.
11. It should be noted that those jurisdictions which follow the rule in Jackson
v. Hooper have only dealt with situations where the partnership is non-existent in
the sense that the entire function of the partnership is performed by the subsequently
formed corporations. On the other hand, the jurisdictions which have applied the
rationale of Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th
Cir. 1925), have done so where the partnership function was not absorbed by the
corporations but continued to exist and operate side by side with the corporation.
New York appears to be the only jurisdiction which expressly considers the ques-
tion of whether the subsequent corporation is performing all or part of the partnership
function as determinative.
12. See La Varre v. Hall, 42 F.2d 65, (5th Cir. 1930) (disposition of stock)
Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943) (damages from co-
adventurer); DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955) (accounting as
a co-adventurer) ; Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W.
571 (1941) ; Latimer v. Piper, 261 Mich. 123, 246 N.W. 65 (1933) (rescission granted
on basis of fraud) ; Denny v. Guyston, 327 Mo. 1030, 40 S.W.2d 562 (1931).
13. See Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943) ; Donahue
v. Davis, 68 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1953). Under the screen of the corporate entity,
the partnership, in truth, operates the corporation for the operative advantage of
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American Refrigerator Transit Co.,14 these courts look through the cor-
porate form and interpret the prior existing agreement in order to give
effect to the real intent of the members of the association,15 so long as
the rights of creditors or other third parties do not intervene.' 6 The
logic of this approach lies in the distinction between a closely-held cor-
poration and one in which there are public investors. In the latter, there
is a separation of ownership and management, and strict adherence to
statutes governing the operation of corporate management is therefore
required in order to minimize the possibility of a fraud being perpetrated
upon the investor.' 7 The problem does not, however, arise in the closely-
held corporation since ownership and management are usually the same. 18
There being no other shareholders to protect in this situation, there would
appear to be no policy reason preventing recognition of the original part-
nership agreement.
By the instant decision, New Jersey has aligned itself with numerous
other states 19 adopting the view that a corporation may operate subject
to a prior agreement. The court here, however, has extended that doctrine
to include the liquidation of the corporations to facilitate a cash distri-
bution where such would be necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
prior agreement.20 Without the proffered alternative of an opportunity
for the defendants to buy the plaintiff out in cash,2' the decision would
appear to be a harsh one, especially since the plaintiff was granted liqui-
dation of the corporations on the ground that the partnership agreement
14. 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926). "If corpora-
tions carry on part of their business through subsidiary companies, it makes little
difference what such companies may be called; there is no particular divinity sur-
rounding the term 'corporation.' The court will look through the form to get at
the real intent of the association of individuals or corporations forming the organ-
ization ... , and will give effect to the real purpose of the organization to promote
square dealings and effectuate justice."
15. Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d.335 (8th Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926) ; Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 240 N.C. 49, 82 S.E.2d 771 (1954).
16. Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926) ; Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354,
136 P.2d 651 (1943) ; Denny v. Guyston, 327 Mo. 1030, 40 S.W.2d 562 (1931).
Where there are additional shareholders who are not members of the original
agreement, or creditors who have relied on the responsibility of the corporations, to
subject them to the terms of the original partnership agreement would be unjust.
17. See cases cited note 5 supra.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. See e.g., Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943);
Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571 (1941).
20. See note 2 supra. The court's sympathy for the plaintiff 'is understandable,
in view of the fact that his new position as a minority stock-holder would deprive
him of the full voice in management and policy-making which he had as a full partner,
and an equal opportunity to procure a comfortable position within the business struc-
ture. In addition, since this was a closely-held corporation, the plaintiff might have
difficulty selling his stock.
21. The defendants had the alternative of buying out the plaintiff in cash only
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never contemplated their acquisition. 22 Even assuming this to be true, the
unauthorized acts of acquiring the corporations seem to have been ratified
by the plaintiff's failure of timely objection and receipt of corporate
benefits. 23 Not only would plaintiff appear to have ratified the acquisition
of the corporations, but it would seem that consent to the conversion of
partnership assets into corporate stock would contemplate the equal dis-
tribution of such stock upon the dissolution of the partnership even though
the original agreement provided for payment in specie. 24 The fact that
the plaintiff was a minor at the time the partnership was originally formed, 25
and when the first corporation was acquired,26 should not affect the out-
come since he had already reached his majority when the original, oral
partnership agreement Was replaced by a written agreement.27
Jack E. Levin
RELEASE-FELA-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY To
PROVE FRAUD OR MISTAKE.
Maxfield v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. (Utah 1958)
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant railroad, signed for the sum of
710 dollars a release of any claim against the railroad for injuries he
received while riding on the back of a railroad truck. In this action
brought under the FELA, plaintiff contended that the release was invalid
because it was obtained by duress in that the defendant threatened the
plaintiff with the loss of his job if he refused to accept the settlement.
Plaintiff also claimed that the release was void on the ground of mutual
mistake of fact that plaintiff had no permanent injuries. The railroad
confessed liability because of the negligence of its truck driver, but chose
to defend upon the release. From a judgment of 5,000 dollars for plaintiff
the defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that plaintiff had the burden of proving the invalidity
22. Id. at 218.
23. See MECHE1m, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 283 (2d ed. 1920).
24. Applying the reasoning of the court that the plaintiff should not be forced
to accept an equal distribution of stock since the partnership agreement did not
contemplate the acquisition of corporations, if the agreement had contemplated such
acquisition by the partnership, the plaintiff would have to be satisfied with a stock
distribution. Ratification of such acquisition should work the same result as a pro-
vision in the original agreement.
25. The partnership was originally formed in 1934. Although the record is not
clear what the plaintiff's age was at the time the partnership was first formed, the
fact that he graduated from college in 1939 would tend to indicate that he was a
minor in 1934.
26. Fortugno Realty Company was established in 1935.
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of the release merely by a preponderance of the evidence, asserting that
the requirement should have been clear and convincing evidence. The
Supreme Court of Utah in affirming the judgment, held that the weight
of evidence for the avoidence of a release under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act1 is the same as applied to issues of fact in civil matters gen-
erally, viz., the preponderance of the evidence. Maxfield v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., 330 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1958).2
In regard to releases generally, federal courts3 have held that the
burden of persuasion is on the party alleging the fraud or mistake, and
that the burden must be met by clear and convincing evidence. 4 The
rationale generally offered in support of this burden of proof is twofold:
First, the courts are reluctant to rescind or reform written contracts on
the basis of parol or extrinsic evidence ;5 the courts state that the stability
of the commercial community demands special assurance of the enforce-
ment of contracts as written as against subsequent inconsistent claims.
Secondly, and more particularly in the case of releases, it is the policy of
the law to promote and sustain the compromise and settlement of dis-
puted claims, and to minimize litigation. 6 In the case of releases arising
specifically from claims under the FELA there is a conflict in the federal
courts as to the weight of the burden of persuasion that one must satisfy
in alleging that the release is void because of mistake or fraud. Some
federal courts have adopted the rule applicable to releases generally and
require a showing of fraud or mistake by clear and convincing evidence. 7
Other jurisdictions have asserted, as did the court in the instant case,
that the requisite burden of proof for avoiding a release is to demonstrate
fraud or mistake merely by a preponderance of the evidence., These latter
cases offer no reason for adopting the lesser standard of proof and seem
to rely on the dissenting opinion in Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R.,9 which
asserted, without supporting authority or rationale, that the lower require-
ment of proof is the rule in actions arising under the FELA. The Su-
preme Court, however, has taken no majority position on this question.
A theory in support of the lower standard of proof was suggested in
Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R. 10 where the dissent urged that releases under
1. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
2. Maxfield v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 330 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1958).
3. The validity of a release under the FELA raises a federal question to be de-
termined by federal rather than state law. South Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern, 344 U.S.
367 (1952).
4. Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. Albrittion, 21 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1927).
5. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 19 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1927).
6. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Wilcox, 116 Fed. 913 (8th Cir. 1902).
7. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Callen v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 162 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Whitmarsh v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F.
Supp. 850 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
8. Camerlin v. New York Cent. R.R., 199 F.2d 698 (Ist Cir. 1952); Purvis v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 198 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1952) (dictum).
9. 342 U.S. 359, 369 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
10. 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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the FELA should be governed by the same rules which apply to releases
by seamen under admirality law. Seamen are considered wards of the
court, and one claiming a release as a defense is charged with the burden
of proving that the release was freely made, absent duress, mistake, or
fraud." The reasoning advanced in support of this rule is that seamen
are regarded as necessitious persons, under strong economic pressures,
who, because of their helplessness, are to be protected from hard bargains.' 2
The Supreme Court in the Callen case expressly held that in cases
arising under the FELA, the burden of persuasion is on the party who
attacks a release as invalid because of mutual mistake or fraud. The
Court thereby refused to accept the general analogy to admirality law as
to the party required to bear the burden of persuasion, but did not reach
the question of what the burden should be. As the same economic pressures
often exist, coupled with the inherent duress arising from a fear of loss
of employment from failure to compromise, it would appear that where
the injured party is a non-maritime employee he would be better protected
by the lower requirement of proof adopted in the instant case. The federal
courts, moreover, in situations such as the one in the instant case, have
recognized that economic inequality between the employer and employee,
similar to that present here, may result in the absence of free bargaining.13
That inequalities will arise where there is such a disparity in bargaining
power is demonstrated by the fact that the plaintiff settled for 710 dollars,
for injuries later evaluated by a jury to be worth 5,000 dollars. Finally,
since the releases here are not standard commercial contracts between
businessmen, if the rule of evidence announced by this court is adopted
by the federal courts, it should not have the effect of disrupting com-
mercial practice generally; and, as the relationship of the parties is one
of employment, it is difficult to see how the rule of the instant case can
serve to destroy the general community confidence in the enforceability
of private settlements of disputes. It should be noted, however, that the
Utah Supreme Court has merely stated what it believes the federal law
to be on this particular question, and, as such, this determination does
not have the weight of stare decisis in the federal courts. 14
William B. Colsey, III
11. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
12. Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1941).
13. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison, 309 U.S. 261 (1940)
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
14. Since there is no clear majority position on this question among the federal
courts, and since the Supreme Court has not yet decided this problem, the Utah
court considered itself free to predict how the Supreme Court would handle this
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